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[5a, 5b] Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death o[
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's
it is
error to instruct
that mere fact that accident
considered alone, does not
inference that
some or any
to action was negligent, since such instruction in effect tells jury that fact that child was killed by bullet
from defendant's gun affords no evidence of
and
though instructions on res ipsa loquitur were not rejury should not be foreclosed from considering evidence provided by happening of accident itself in determining
whether defendant was negligent.
[6] Id.-Civil Liability.-Ordinarily accidents resulting from disof fhearms do not occur if persons using them use due
care.
[7] !d.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death of
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's rifle, it is
!'rror to instruct Jury that "unavoidable" or "inevitable" accident simply denotes accident that occurred without having
been proximately caused by negligence, and that even if such
accident could have been avoided by exercise of exceptional
foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be held liable for
injuries resulting from it.

APPEAI, from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County and from an order denying a new trial. Sherrill
Halbert, ,Judge. ,Judgment reversed; appeal from order dismissed.
Action for damages for wrongful death.
defendant reversed.

,Judgment for

Vernon F. Gant for Appellants.
David I<'. Bush and Bush, Ackley & JVIilich for Respondent.
'l'RAYNOR, J.-Judgment was entered on a verdict for
defendant in an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs appeal
from the judgment and the order denying their motion for
a new trial. Since the latter order is not appealable, the
appeal therefrom is dismissed.
On May 21, 1951, Bonnie, 12, and her sister, Carolyn, 8,
got off the school bus at the intersection of vVren and Sierra
roads in Stanislaus County at about 4 :10 p. m. and started

JENSEN V. MINARD
[ 44 C.2d 325; 282 P.2d 7]

327

\Y ren Hoad. Defendant's home is located
to the 1wst of the intersection of \Vren and
Sierra
which bound his farm land on the east and
north. He testified that he >vas acquainted with the ,Jensen
chilc1ren and had frequently seen them
off the bus at
\Ynn and Sierra roads. He saw them
off on the
m
while he was
with a friend on the patio of
his home and \Yatched them
\Vren Road
until
were lost from view. At about this time he stood
up and :fired a .22 caliber rifle at a sparrow in his strawberry patch approximately 60 or 65 feet away. He looked
up and down ·wren R.oad and into the field beyond before
firing and the children were not in sight. Shortly after firing
the rifle, he heard a child scream, and he ran toward vVren
Road and found Bonnie lying on the road approximately 180
feet south of his line of fire and approximately 200 yards
from the point of firing. She had been struck in the head
by a bullet from his gun and died later that day. To support
their theory that defendant must have fired in the direction
of the children, plaintiffs introduced expert testimony indicating that the bullet had not ricocheted. Defendant introduced expert testimony indicating that it had. To prove
that he was not negligent in failing to foresee the possibility
of harm from a richochet, he presented expert testimony that
the chance of the accident's happening as a result of a ricochet
was only one in ten million.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury that "One who causes injury to another by
discharging a firearm must, in order to excuse himself from
liability, show that he was absolutely without fault." This
instruction, taken from the opinion of the court in Rudd v.
Byrnes, 156 Cal. 636, 640 [J05 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 26
1-l.R.A.N.S. 134], not only requires that the defendant be
absolutely without fault but places the burden of proof of this
issue on him. [1] In ordinary negligence cases, however,
the standard of care is ordinary care under the circumstances
and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The question is
presented, therefore, whether the court in the Rudd case
meant to establish a special rule to govern injuries caused
firearms. When the language is read in context, it is clear
that the court did not establish such a rule, but was merely
emphasizing the proposition that owing to the dangerous
character of the instrumentality ordinary care in the use
of firearms requires a very high degree of caution. [2] "In
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we do not know of any
English case of this kind
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where unsuccessful
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doctrine of strict liability has been
our American courts in different
ways. As summed up in American Jurisprudence (voL 56,
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p. 1006), ''The
handling of a firearm is determined
the application of
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to the care which must be exercised by
one using dangerous
or instrumentalities. It is often
said tl1at a yery
of care is required from all
persons
firearms in the immediate
of others regardless of hmY lawful or innocent such use may be, or that
more than ordinary care to prevent
to others is required. Some courts refer to the degree of care required
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